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Letter # 66
WSB-S- 729

27 May 1949

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Chief, Foreign Branch W

Operations
TILESTONIAN Communication Channels.

REFERENCE: STOC 561

1. The security problem involved in target briefing by W/T and requesting answers via the same channel is appreciated by Headquarters, and consideration of other channels for transmittal of information is certainly desirable. The use of micro-dot equipment, which you suggest in reference, is considered by our technicians to be unsuitable at the present time for such purposes, since it has not yet been developed to a point at which good results can be obtained by other than expert technicians.

2. Instead of the micro-dot, it is suggested that we provide you with a good secret ink, in the use of which the participants in the next expedition can be trained. However, before an informed decision as to the appropriate type of ink to be employed can be made, we should have as much of the following area censorship information as TIRRALIBRA and his colleagues can furnish:

- A. What is the number and what are the locations of censorship stations in the general area?
- B. Which stations have laboratory facilities?
- C. Are all stations equipped with ultra-violet equipment?
- D. What is the extent of the technical training of the censorship personnel?
- E. Is examination simply visual?
- F. Is all mail from foreign countries opened?
- G. Is all mail addressed to a foreign country examined?
- H. Is mail addressed abroad submitted to the postal authorities prior to sealing?

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- I. Is part of the mail examined overtly and part covertly?
- J. Is censored mail stamped as having been examined?
- K. Are stamps removed?
- L. Is there any evidence of chemical analysis of letters?
- M. If so, what types of chemicals are used in this analysis?
- N. Are there any unusual delays in transit, or is the two-week period mentioned in reference considered to be normal?

3. It is realized that answers to the above cannot be had simply for the asking; the questions are intended rather as a debriefing guide, and an indication of what, under ideal circumstances, we would like to know, and they should be presented to TIRRALIERA in that light, for such debriefing as he can arrange.

4. In addition, the following samples from the Baltic area of the U.S.S.R. would be extremely useful in providing us with operational information:

- A. Samples of commonly used drugs in native packages (to be used for concealing chemicals) in pill, tablet, capsule or powder form. Prescription labels would also be of value.
- B. Samples of commonly used papers. All types are of interest - business, typewriter, and ordinary private stationery and envelopes. White, rather than colored paper is desired, unless it is not commonly used.
- C. Any samples of letters received in Scandinavia (or elsewhere) from the U.S.S.R. (These are of value for laboratory examination.)

5. In answer to paragraph nine of reference, this office can only advise that the TILSTONE teams use one or more already existing correspondences which has been permitted by the Soviets for some time in the past with an outside country, since any newly-started correspondence immediately arouses suspicion. Since the TILSTONE contacts in the past have mailed letters from within the U.S.S.R., it is felt that they are better qualified to judge the most practical means of using correspondence than are we. Should it be necessary to establish a letter-drop for this correspondence in some country other than Sweden, this can probably be arranged.

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